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Ethical and Aesthetic Alterity
Slavery and the Romantic Imagination by Debbie Lee. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2002. Pp. 224 + xi. $19.95 paper, $55.00 cloth.
In this elegant, deeply illuminating book, Debbie Lee argues that Britain’s
imperial, colonial practice of slavery and British Romantic writers’ theory and
practice of visionary imagination are interdependent developments. More
radically, she claims that the imagination theorized and practiced by these
writers is fundamentally shaped by their nation’s confrontation with the moral
crisis of slavery. Even when not overtly representing slavery, then, these
Romantic works offered and still offer ethical models for understanding,
respecting, and learning from cultural and racial difference.
While this approach benefits from two decades of critical studies that
have challenged the claims of visionary imagination to be autonomous from
historical context, she does not argue, like some New Historicists and neoMarxists, that these writers were blind to the deeper economic structures or
the historical events that shaped their works. Instead, she argues first that this
Romantic ideology is a conscious, deliberate recognition of a crisis in individual and national ethics; and second, that the imagination developed through
this conscious struggle is simultaneously “autonomous” and profoundly
interdependent with others’ minds and feelings. She does not reject the outward, imperial “usurping” of a Wordsworthian egotistical sublime but calls up
alternative models for an ethical imagination: Blake’s “self-annihilation,”
Keats’s negative capability, Shelley’s imaginative love as the great secret of
morals, and Coleridge’s hope that we can “think ourselves in the Thoughts and
Feelings of others” (32). To bring these opposing ethical stances into relationship with one another, Lee calls upon Levinas’s concept of “alterity.” Alterity, she points out, develops its ethical significance through Coleridge: “He
opposes ‘selfishness and identity’ to ‘otherness and alterity,’ whose synthesis is
‘the community of the spirit’” (36). “Unlike the term ‘otherness,’” Lee writes,
quoting Galen E. Johnson and Michael B. Smith, “‘alterity’ shifts the focus of
philosophical concern away from the ‘epistemic other’ to the concrete ‘moral
other’ of practices—political, cultural, linguistic, artistic, and religious’” (37).
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“Like Coleridge,” Lee continues, “Levinas describes alterity as the self’s
responsibility for the other, as the self’s imperative to place the other at the center of his or her own being, and as the self’s desire to respect and preserve the
difference of that other” (39). “Romantic alterity,” then, “the philosophical
underpinning of the distanced imagination, helped writers to form some of
the most powerful poetic works of the period. This aspect of the Romantic
imagination developed in conjunction with the entire culture’s growing
awareness of the alterity of Africans and slaves (who were the most discursively visible example of British otherness).” Thus, she writes, “I believe that
a strand of what has been canonized as Romantic writing explores issues of
alterity that are directly related to slavery” (41).
This approach allows her to overcome the schism that Joan Baum’s 1995
study sought to establish between works that directly and didactically advocated abolition, such as Cowper’s poems, and works that did not represent
their authors’ actual sympathy for abolition directly but achieved a more aesthetic and philosophic distance through a broadly humanist definition of
imagination. Lee’s concept of an empathetic alterity as a loss of self in the face
of the other’s difference serves a function similar to Helen Thomas’s bridging
category between abolition advocacy and Romantic imagination, the ecstatic
loss of boundaries experienced in evangelical conversion narratives. Yet the
dialectical and paradoxical element of difference and distance in Lee’s “alterity” resists what one might term the empire-building of a specifically Christian
evangelism.
After her introductory chapters, the body of Lee’s book is a deceptively
simple framework for her complex readings of individual works. Her three
sections move both geographically and chronologically from “Hazards and
Horrors in the Slave Colonies” through “Fascination and Fear in Africa” to
“Facing Slavery in Britain.” In the first section she analyzes Coleridge’s
“Ancient Mariner” and interprets Blake’s designs for Stedman’s Narrative of a
Five Years’ Expedition Against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam as a basis for
reading The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Visions of the Daughter of Albion, and
“The Little Black Boy.” In the second she reads Keats’s Lamia and Percy Shelley’s The Witch of Atlas, both usually read as poems about the play of imagination, as works evoking Africa’s magical religions and its mysterious interior. In
the third she reads Frankenstein in conjunction with the figures of monstrosity and cannibalism used by both sides in the 1823 debates over abolition of
slavery. Then she examines the way two writers—William Wordsworth and
Mary Prince—represent Afro-British or Afro-French women who migrate to
Britain itself, bringing uncomfortably home the experience of slavery and its
cost to families.
Even when the works Lee analyzes deal explicitly with slavery or with
Africans, as in Wordsworth’s poems about Haitian exiles, Mary Prince’s His-
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tory, or Blake’s engravings for Stedman, her broad hermeneutic framework and
the particular works and topics she explores yield provocative new readings—
and those readings have a cumulative explanatory power. Instead of discussing Blake’s designs of tortured slaves for Stedman’s volume, she focuses on
a double-edged interpretation of his designs representing monkeys. Tracing
medieval European “ape-lore” that attributed excessive sexuality to monkeys,
she shows how pro-slavery advocates transferred these attributes to a race
they needed to see as subhuman. On the other hand, she borrows Henry
Gates’s motif of the “signifying monkey” and Homi Bhabha’s analysis of colonial mimicry to argue that Blake’s monkeys practice a “mock-mimicry” subversive of colonial power. Mock-mimicry, she suggests, informs not only
Blake’s critique but actual slave resistance. Mary Prince’s narrative, Lee argues,
acts as a corrective to increasingly stereotyped, if sympathetic, depictions of
slave mothers who fail to protect or nurture their children. She also argues that
Wordsworth’s lyrical ballad “The Mad Mother” and—if to a lesser degree—
“The Thorn” should be read as just such portraits of exiled African mothers.
To argue that slavery is the primary source or purpose of Wordsworth’s
repeated portrayals of deserted mothers in the 1790s seems to ignore his guilt
over Annette Vallon, but it is very possible that personal and national guilt
might merge in these haunting poems.
When Lee interprets two major works that do not overtly take slavery as
their subject but have frequently been read over the past decade as symbolic,
indirect representations of slavery or the slave trade—“The Ancient Mariner”
and Frankenstein—she builds on those interpretations by moving beyond the
alienation of slavers’ guilt or of the creature’s alienating monstrosity to analyze
both works through their portrayal of alterity as interdependence. The
“skinny hand, so brown” of the mariner and his feverish compulsion to repeat
his narrative suggest to Lee the symptoms of yellow fever, the tropical disease
that attacked European colonizers but not their already-exposed African
slaves. Her interpretation does not stop with the material disease, however,
but asks “What happened when foreign matter or foreigners became part of
the physical or political body” (48). If the physical “pestilence” is an example
of the moral disease incurred by a nation that tolerates slavery, it also represents the “otherness” of a different race. If individuals and nations construct
subjectivity, as Kristeva argues, by abjecting foreign material as if it is decay
and death, the mariner is able to overturn this abjection when he blesses the
water snakes in the “rotting deep” and transforms it into a positive, Levinasian
alterity.
Lee’s reading of Frankenstein carefully refuses to claim that Mary Shelley
intended the creature to represent either an African or a racist fear of the
enslaved. Instead, she argues that the overt monstrosity and figurative cannibalism of the novel become terms used by both sides as Britain opened up the
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debate on the abolition of slavery itself; the second edition of the novel, she
points out, appeared just as this debate began. She shows how these images of
monstrosity and cannibalism, used both literally and figuratively, mark a “devastating failure of alterity,” a failure of Europeans to accept responsibility for
slaves and ex-slaves as ethical, separate selves. This failure is analogous to
Frankenstein’s refusal to grant the creature such alterity.
Because Keats’s Lamia and Percy Shelley’s The Witch of Atlas both explore
the play of a magically transformative imagination, they appear to offer test
cases for the broadest claim of Lee’s argument, that Romantic imagination and
the moral crisis of slavery are mutually defining and thus that any Romantic
poem, the more visionary the better, might be interpreted not only in terms of
alterity but in the more specific political context of slavery. Though such a
position might be inferred from her argument, Lee is careful not to make her
applications so universal. And in fact, she shows, these two poems both have
links to Africa and thus to a grounding of imagination’s flights in the actual
politics of empire and slavery. In Lempriere’s mythological handbook which
Keats consulted frequently, the lamia is described as having an African origin,
and Shelley’s playful witch emerges from African mountains and travels along
the Nile—details well known but little attended to. Both writers, she shows,
were familiar with African narratives of exploration. “The paradox at the center of Lamia” is the African religion of obeah and its serpent-worship, which
contains a “power [both] to liberate and [to] enslave its practitioners,” especially when they entered a trancelike state (132). Because the poem also “identifies the serpent . . . intimately with Milton’s Satan,” it makes the resisting
reader complicit in dismissing the African serpent-woman and her threat of
“inter-racial love” as a fearful otherness instead of a complex alterity. As to
Shelley’s African poem, “The lady-witch and her hermaphrodite . . . capture
with precision two issues at the heart of African travel during Shelley’s own
day: what exactly was the connection between exploration of Africa’s interior
and exploration of the human interior by Romantic writers? And how did gender codes coincide with the mapping of both?” (142). The “randomness and
error” of the witch’s journey, she argues, “replace the supposedly accurate and
orderly progressions of Britain’s charting of Africa” (145); and her guide, the
hermaphrodite, challenges the trope of seeing the land as female and hence to
be sexually conquered. Finally, her evocation of Levinas’s and Derrida’s association of ethical intimacy “at home” not only with an alterity that places other
before self but with Derrida’s notorious post-Freudian definition of woman as
“lack” is either a brilliant redefinition of Derrida’s point or a temporary collapse into gender stereotypes that would preclude the more profound ethical
alterity that Lee proposes as the basis for Romantic imagination.
Like a more enduring, more ethical version of Lamia’s magic, Lee’s book
exercises a transformative power of its own, both in its specific readings and
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in its overarching hermeneutic framework of “alterity.” I find her Levinasian
interpretation of alterity as a root of Romantic imagination profoundly important as a way to draw together philosophical and political approaches to this
literature. As a way to discuss the overwhelming political and moral crisis of
the slave trade, alterity proves to be a powerful interpretive concept. If I find
myself occasionally resisting specific readings, I have the greatest admiration
for Lee’s ability to apply her hermeneutic model in multiple ways as she
responds to the ambiguities of the works and the ambivalences of their original audiences.
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
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